



Cognitive control research is concerned with the question how we install adaptive 
behaviour in the case of (cognitive) conflict. In this review we focus on the role that 
awareness of this conflict plays in our ability to exert cognitive control. We will argue 
that visual conflict is not the only building block of metacognitive experiences of 
conflict and discuss how they are related to cognitive control. So, a first aim of the 
current review is to understand how these different metacognitive judgements are 
created. To do so, we draw some remarkable parallels with research on metacognition 
in decision making and memory research. Next, we elaborate on the relationship 
between metacognition and adaptive behaviour, with a specific focus on the role of 
subjective experiences in the Gratton effect. The grey areas that persist in the current 
literature are highlighted. In addition to deciphering the mechanisms of metacognitive 
judgements in cognitive control, this overview also aims to further enlarge our 
understanding of metacognitive abilities at a more general level.
CORRESPONDING AUTHOR: 
Wim Gevers
Center for Research in 
Cognition & Neurosciences 
(CRCN) and UNI. Université 







TO CITE THIS ARTICLE:
Questienne, L., van Dijck, J.-P., 
& Gevers, W. (2021). The Role 
of Subjective Experiences 
in Conflict Tasks: A Review. 
Psychologica Belgica, 61(1), 
pp. 46–62. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.5334/pb.508
LAURENCE QUESTIENNE 
JEAN-PHILIPPE VAN DIJCK 
WIM GEVERS 
*Author affiliations can be found in the back matter of this article
The Role of Subjective 
Experiences in Conflict 
Tasks: A Review
47Questienne et al. Psychologica Belgica DOI: 10.5334/pb.508
Imagine waiting at a red traffic light where a 
policeman is facing you holding one hand up. When the 
traffic light turns green, you may automatically tighten 
the muscles of your right leg despite the policeman is still 
holding his hand up. When you become aware of this, you 
will probably pay increased attention to the instructions 
of the policeman to avoid accidents. There are a lot of 
everyday situations where our subjective experiences 
seem powerful at signaling the need to control and 
adapt our strategies to achieve our goal. The ultimate 
aim of this review is to understand which mechanisms 
underlie the emergence of such subjective experiences 
and to indicate their potential role in cognitive control 
and behavioral adaptation. In this first part, we describe 
the most important theories on cognitive control and 
explore whether awareness of conflicting information 
in the stimulus (e.g. are you aware that policeman and 
traffic lights indicate different actions) is needed to install 
adaptation. We will argue that, even if participants are 
not aware of the conflicting information, it is still possible 
that they have a subjective experience of difficulty, 
related to this unconscious conflict (e.g. you feel that 
you want to break and start riding at the same time). 
The second part of this review will focus on the question 
how such metacognitive judgements of difficulty are 
created. To do so, insights from studies on metacognition 
in memory and decision-making literature will be used. 
In the last part we consider the possible function of such 
metacognitive judgements for cognitive adaptation. 
COGNITIVE CONTROL AND CONFLICT 
TASKS: THE CASE OF THE GRATTON 
EFFECT
Cognitive control refers to the ability to adjust our 
information processing and our actions according to 
our goals in a complex environment that contains 
conflicting information (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Cognitive 
control is especially important to overrule automatic or 
usual responses that are inadequate in a given context 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001). Take another look at the driving example 
above. Most of the time, responding to the color of the 
traffic light is the obvious strategy to follow to start 
driving. However, this is no longer true in the presence of 
a policeman. In this case, you need to ignore the traffic 
light and to follow the instructions of the policeman. 
The processing of the information available in the 
environment needs to be adapted based on the context 
to modify behavior in agreement with our current goals. 
Cognitive control implies different cognitive functions 
(e.g., cognitive flexibility, response inhibition, orienting of 
attention, etc.; see e.g., Diamond, 2013) studied through 
different experimental paradigms. For instance, in task-
switching paradigms, participants are asked to switch 
from one task to another depending on the context 
(for an overview, see Kiesel et al., 2010). In stop-signal 
paradigms, participants inhibit an already prepared 
motor response when a stop-signal occurs (e.g., Logan, 
1982). In the current work, we are especially interested 
in paradigms that ask participants to deal with conflicting 
responses generated by automatically processed but in 
that specific context, irrelevant information. We group 
these paradigms under the generic term of “conflict 
tasks”. Conflict tasks use stimuli with task- relevant and 
task-irrelevant dimensions. Typically, the task irrelevant 
dimension contains highly familiar information which 
is processed automatically. As such, when participants 
respond to the task-relevant dimension, they inhibit the 
task-irrelevant dimension. A prototypical example of such 
a conflict task is the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). In this task, 
participants are presented with colour words presented in 
a certain colour (e.g. the word ‘green’ presented in the 
colour ‘red’). Participants must name the colour of the ink 
(red) while ignoring the colour word (green). Colour and 
colour words can be congruent (e.g. blue written in blue) or 
incongruent (e.g. blue written in red). Because (in literate 
people), reading is an automatic process, participants are 
distracted by the meaning of the incongruent word. As 
a result, participants make more errors and are slower 
to name the colour ink on incongruent compared to 
congruent trials (e.g., MacLeod, 1991). 
It has consistently been shown that the congruency 
effect is smaller after incongruent compared to after 
congruent trials (Gratton et al., 1992; see Figure 1). This 
sequential modulation is known as the “Gratton effect”, 
also called the “congruency sequence effect” or “conflict 
adaptation”. It is often interpreted as the result of a 
modulation of information processing and response 
selection (e.g., Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Nigbur, Schneider, 
Sommer, Dimigen, & Stürmer, 2015; Stürmer et al., 2002) 
in response to task demands. In other words, the Gratton 
effect would be a hallmark of top-down cognitive control 
meaning that more control is engaged after conflict is 
detected by the conflict monitoring unit of the participant 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). This 
effect is not only present in the Stroop task (e.g., Kerns et 
al., 2004), but observed across different types of conflict 
tasks: e.g. the Flanker task (e.g., Gratton et al., 1992), the 
Simon task (e.g., Notebaert & Verguts, 2011a; Stürmer, 
Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002) and in 
experiments using priming (e.g., Kunde, 2003; van Gaal, 
Lamme, & Ridderinkhof, 2010).
In its original description, Gratton (1992) suggested that 
the effect results from an adaptation based on stimulus 
expectancies. People would expect congruency repetitions 
rather than congruency alternations. Consequently, 
after an incongruent trial, participants would focus 
more on the relevant dimension because they expect 
another incongruent trial. However, empirical studies 
show that the influence of such expectancies remains 
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limited to situations that strongly induce or explicitly cue 
these expectancies (e.g., Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, 
& Notebaert, 2013; Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; Duthoo, 
Wühr, & Notebaert, 2013; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013). In 
other words, repetition expectancy is not sufficient to 
explain all the Gratton effects reported in the literature 
(for an overview, see also Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, 
Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014). 
The conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
see also Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 
2004; see Figure 2) provides with a theory on when 
information processing is biased towards the processing 
of the relevant information and the suppression of 
the irrelevant information. On incongruent trials, 
competitive responses are activated by the task-relevant 
and the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension. According 
to the conflict monitoring theory, a monitoring system 
detects this co-activation of competitive responses, 
which is called response conflict. In this theory it is 
assumed that at the cerebral level, monitoring is done 
by the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) and, more 
precisely, by the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). When a 
high level of response conflict is detected, the ACC sends 
a signal to the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
that induces cognitive control. This cognitive control 
biases information processing in favour of the relevant 
dimension on the next trial. This model received empirical 
support from electrophysiological and neuroimaging 
Figure 1 Classical Gratton effect.
After an incongruent trial, the difference between congruent and incongruent trials is reduced (simulated data for illustrative purposes).
Figure 2 Schematic representation of the conflict monitoring theory.
In a Stroop task, the ink colour and the word activate their corresponding response. In case of incongruent trials, competition is 
detected between the responses activated by the task-relevant and by the task- irrelevant dimension. As a result, attention on the 
task-relevant dimension is increased on the next trial. (adapted from Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001).
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studies (Kerns, 2006; Kerns et al., 2004; Yeung, 
Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004), but it also demonstrates 
some weaknesses. For instance, how exactly the bias 
in information processing is implemented, must still 
be deciphered (e.g., Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert, & 
Verguts, 2016). Also, whether the ACC really detects 
response conflict or other aspects (like time on task or 
error likelihood) remains highly debated in the literature 
(e.g., Alexander & Brown, 2011; Botvinick, 2007; Burle, 
Allain, Vidal, & Hasbroucq, 2005; Silvetti, Seurinck, & 
Verguts, 2011). In any case, the conflict monitoring 
theory highlights an important component of cognitive 
control: cognitive control implies continuous monitoring 
of the ongoing action to detect situations that require 
adaptation. This hypothesis that a system continuously 
monitors our actions is shared with other theories of 
adaptive behaviour, (for an overview, see Ullsperger, 
Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014).
Other theories argue that the Gratton effect is 
triggered by bottom-up factors instead of top-down 
control (for an overview, see also Duthoo et al., 
2014). In this context, the feature integration account 
suggests that the Gratton effect is the result from low-
level stimulus repetition effects (e.g., Hommel, Proctor, 
& Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003). According 
to this account, on every trial, stimulus and response 
features are temporarily associated. If, on the next 
trial, the association is maintained, processing will be 
relatively easy. If the association is violated, responses 
will slow down, and more errors will be made. A 
Gratton effect is observed because the associations are 
maintained better with congruency repetitions than 
with congruency alternations. Another account, the 
contingency learning account (Schmidt, 2013; Schmidt 
& Besner, 2008; Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman, & Besner, 
2007; Schmidt & De Houwer, 2011), directly follows 
from these attempts to control for such bottom-up 
sequential effects. In most of the studies using four-
choice congruency tasks, to maintain 50% of congruent 
trials, an irrelevant dimension (e.g., the word blue) is 
more often associated with a congruent response (e.g., 
blue written in blue) than with an incongruent response 
(e.g., blue written in red) (Schmidt, 2013). Participants 
learn such contingencies and it was observed that 
contingency learning boosts the Gratton effect (Schmidt 
et al., 2007).
However, even when both stimulus repetitions and 
contingency are controlled for, a Gratton effect is still 
observed (e.g., Kim & Cho, 2014; Notebaert, Gevers, 
Verbruggen, & Liefooghe, 2006; Schmidt & Weissman, 
2014). Currently the consensus seems to be that 
both bottom-up (associative) and top- down (conflict 
adaptation) factors contribute to the Gratton effect 
(Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & Notebeaert, 
2014) and that their effects can be disentangled (Braem 
et al., 2019; Egner, 2008). 
THE AWARENESS OF CONFLICT 
INDUCING STIMULI AND COGNITIVE 
CONTROL
The definition of consciousness is by-itself a matter 
of debate (e.g., Baars & Laureys, 2005; Block, 2005; 
Kouider, de Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010). For the 
current purpose, we rely on a definition given by Lau and 
Rosenthal (2011) who use the term “consciousness” 
(also “conscious awareness”) to refer to mental states 
that occur with a subjective experience. A subjective 
experience is “what it feels like” to be in a certain state 
(Nagel, 1974; see also Glossary, Table I-1, p. 24). In line 
with Lau and Rosenthal (2011), we assume that conscious 
mental states can be explicitly reported. However, it is 
possible that this explicit report is limited merely because 
of a lack of words (e.g., Kouider et al., 2010). For instance, 
a consciously experienced smell can be difficult to 
verbalise because there is no verbal “label” corresponding 
with the subjective experience that it generates.
The nature of the relationship between consciousness 
and cognitive control is highly debated in the literature 
(e.g., Hommel, 2007, 2013, 2017; Kunde, Reuss, & 
Kiesel, 2012; Mayr, 2004; van Gaal, De Lange, & Cohen, 
2012). One major question is whether awareness of 
the events that call for cognitive control is necessary to 
trigger cognitive and behavioural adaptation. One of the 
most influential theories of consciousness, the Global 
Neuronal Network theory (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001), 
makes a direct theoretical link between consciousness 
and cognitive control. This theory suggests that 
different cerebral networks can unconsciously process 
information. Routine actions, such as subliminal visual 
processing (e.g., Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & 
Schwarsbach, 2003), can be performed by such modular 
networks. Importantly, information becomes conscious 
when its processing is amplified by attention, making 
it available in a global workspace distributed across 
the entire brain. Once in the global workspace, the 
information becomes available for verbal report and 
for novel or unusual processing that is mandatory for 
cognitive control. This model therefore takes a strong 
position. Events can trigger cognitive control only when 
they are represented in the Global Neuronal Workspace. 
In other words, cognitive control on an event can only 
be excerted if we are conscioulsly aware of the event. 
Supporting this relation, some results suggested that 
the ACC, the brain structure considered the heart of the 
monitoring process in the conflict monitoring theory, 
would be closely related to conscious experience (e.g., 
Dehaene et al., 2003; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Mulert, 
Menzinger, Leicht, Pogarell, & Hegerl, 2005).
However, this latter idea on the relationship between 
conscious awareness and cognitive control is far from 
gaining unanimous support. Firstly, all theories on 
consciousness do not necessarily assume such a strong 
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relationship between consciousness and cognitive 
control (see Lau & Rosenthal, 2011, p. 366 for a 
comparison between several theories of consciousness). 
For instance, other influential views of consciousness 
are the Higher-Order theories of consciousness (for 
overviews, see Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 2004). 
These theories share the idea that consciousness implies 
a higher-order representation of a first-order state. Being 
aware of a visual stimulus implies having a higher-order 
representation of one’s self seeing this visual stimulus. 
However, these theories do not make explicit predictions 
about the relationship between consciousness of conflict 
and cognitive control. Second, the relations that have 
been observed between consciousness and cognitive 
control are correlational rather than causal (Hommel, 
2013, 2017). Third, several empirical studies (for 
overviews, see Kunde et al., 2012; van Gaal et al., 2012) 
suggested that cognitive control can occur while being 
unaware of the stimulus that triggered this control (e.g., 
Hughes, Velmans, & De Fockert, 2009; Mattler, 2003, 2006; 
van Gaal, Lamme, Fahrenfort, & Ridderinkhof, 2011; van 
Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008; 
van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Lamme, 
2009). For instance, Mattler (2003, 2006) observed that 
unconscious cues can facilitate switching form one 
task to another and van Gaal et al. (2009) observed 
that inhibition of motor responses can be triggered by 
an unconscious stimulus. These points challenge the 
hypothesis of a strong functional relationship between 
consciousness and cognitive control.
In the specific case of the Gratton effect, researchers 
tried to determine whether awareness of stimulus 
congruency was necessary for the effect to occur (for 
an overview, see Desender & Van den Bussche, 2012). 
To respond to this question, subliminal priming conflict 
tasks were used (Ansorge, Fuchs, Shah, & Kunde, 2011; 
Desender, Van Lierde, Van den Bussche, Reynvoet, & 
Sommer, 2013; Francken, van Gaal, & de Lange, 2011; 
Frings & Wentura, 2008; Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 
1996; Jiang, Zhang, & van Gaal, 2015; Kunde, 2003; 
van Gaal et al., 2010). For instance, Kunde (2003) used 
an arrow priming conflict task (see Figure 3) in which 
participants responded to the direction of a target arrow 
that could point to the left or to the right (see also 
Vorberg et al., 2003). Importantly, before the target, 
a prime arrow appeared that could point in the same 
or in the opposite direction of the target, generating 
a congruency effect. The crucial point was that in half 
of the trials, primes were presented so fast that they 
were not consciously perceived by the participants (i.e., 
subliminal prime) (Kunde, 2003, Experiment 2). In the 
other half of the trials, the primes were consciously 
detectable (i.e., supraliminal prime). Congruency effects 
were observed with both subliminal and supraliminal 
primes. Similarly, the Gratton effect was independent 
of the conscious awareness of the prime on the current 
trial. However, crucially, the conscious awareness of the 
prime on the previous trial mattered. The Gratton effect 
was observed only if the prime on the previous trial was 
consciously perceived. Similar results were obtained with 
other types of subliminal stimuli (e.g., Ansorge et al., 
2011; Frings & Wentura, 2008; Greenwald et al., 1996). 
This led to the conclusion that conscious awareness of 
stimulus congruency is necessary to trigger cognitive 
control mechanisms responsible for the Gratton effect.
Contradictory to these first studies, other researchers 
(e.g., Desender et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2015; van Gaal et 
al., 2010) also observed a Gratton effect after subliminal 
primes in a very similar priming task as the one used by 
Kunde (2003). The main difference was that the inter-
stimulus interval was reduced and the warning signal 
indicating the beginning of the trial was removed. 
According to Van Gaal et al. (2010), the use of a long inter-
stimulus interval and a warning signal could have made 
the participants release their attention during the inter-
stimulus interval. As traces of subliminal primes are weak, 
releasing attention during the inter-stimulus interval would 
make the traces to disappear before the next trial. 
Figure 3 Arrow priming conflict task.
Example of congruent trial in a subliminal priming conflict task. A prime arrow is presented subliminally or supraliminal before the 
target arrow (adapted from Kunde, 2003).
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Thus, it seems that conscious awareness of stimulus 
congruency is not necessary for a Gratton effect. An 
alternative explanation remains possible, however. 
Even if participants are not consciously aware of the 
stimulus congruency, they could still have a subjective 
experience related to some effects or by-products of this 
congruency. For instance, participants could consciously 
feel that an incongruent trial is “more difficult” (Desender 
& Van den Bussche, 2012; Desender et al., 2013) even if 
the prime itself is not consciously perceived. In this case, 
the Gratton effect following unconscious incongruent 
trials could be explained in terms of adaptation to a 
conscious subjective experience of difficulty related to 
the unconscious stimulus congruency (Kinoshita, Forster, 
& Mozer, 2008; Kinoshita, Mozer, & Forster, 2011). This 
hypothesis leads to several new questions. First, even 
if participants are not aware of stimulus congruency, 
can they still have a subjective experience of difficulty, 
related to this unconscious congruency? Second, if so, 
then how is this subjective experience constructed? We 
need to know to which effect(s) or by-product(s) of the 
congruency the subjective experience is sensitive. Finally, 
is such a subjective experience of difficulty responsible 
for the Gratton effect? In the next sections, we discuss 
what has been described in the literature so far. 
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES OF 
(UNCONSCIOUS) CONGRUENCY
Morsella et al. (2009) conducted a Stroop task where, 
after each trial, participants were asked to judge on 
an 8-points scale the strength of their urge to make 
an error (hereafter called urge-to-err) (Morsella et al., 
2009 Experiment 1, 2 and 3). A stronger urge-to-err was 
reported on incongruent Stroop trials versus congruent 
trials. According to the authors, this result shows that 
participants have a subjective experience related to the 
response competition triggered by incongruent trials. 
However, participants were completely aware of the 
congruency of the stimulus. Therefore, participants could 
merely use the visual stimulus congruency to judge 
their urge-to-err. To dissociate whether the reported 
urge-to-err reflected the perceived stimulus congruency 
or response competition, Morsella et al. used a Flanker 
task (2009, Experiment 4A) with four targets and two 
responses. Participants had to respond to a central target 
letter (S, M, P or H), by pressing left for S and M, and right 
for P and H. On “stimulus conflict trials”, the flanking 
letters were different from the target, but associated 
with the same response as the target. (e.g., in SSMSS). In 
“stimulus + response conflict trials”, the flanking letters 
were different and associated with another response 
(e.g., in SSPSS). Participants reported a higher urge-to-err 
on stimulus + response conflict trials than on stimulus 
conflict trials. The authors argued that when processing 
incongruent trials, participants can consciously perceive 
the stimulus congruency, but would additionally have a 
subjective experience related to response competition. 
Nevertheless, in the Flanker task, again participants 
are fully aware of the different types of congruency. 
Therefore, it is again possible that participants used the 
perceived congruency to judge their urge-to-err.
Tackling this issue, Desender, Van Opstal, and Van 
den Bussche (2014) used a subliminal priming conflict 
task, similar to the task used by Kunde (2003) explained 
previously (see Figure 3). After having responded to the 
target (i.e. first-order task), participants were additionally 
asked to report whether they thought that the prime 
and the target were pointing in the same direction or not 
(second-order task). Because the prime was presented 
close to the awareness threshold, most of the time 
participants could not use their awareness of the prime 
to judge the congruency. To give an answer, participants 
were instructed to use “slowed RTs, error proneness, or 
a vague feeling that something was not right” (Desender 
et al., 2014, p. 2). Remarkably, participants correctly 
classified the congruency of the trials above chance 
level even if unaware of the prime. Later, using the 
same priming task, Desender et al. (2016) showed that 
participants reported a stronger experience of difficulty 
on incongruent than on congruent trials. Additionally, 
and still in a similar subliminal priming conflict task, 
Wenke, Fleming, and Haggard (2010; see also Chambon 
& Haggard, 2012) showed that participants reported 
less experience of control on the consequences of their 
response on incongruent compared to congruent trials. 
Looking at these results concomitantly, it seems that 
participants can judge incongruent trials differently 
from congruent trials, even if unaware of the stimulus 
congruency itself. Participants can report their experience 
of urge-to-err (Morsella et al., 2009), their experience 
of control (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Wenke et al., 
2010), their experience of difficulty (Desender et al., 
2016), or their subjective evaluation of the congruency 
of a trial without being aware of the stimulus presented 
(Desender et al., 2014). In other words, participants 
would have a conscious experience of “processing 
fluency”, an experience that would be modulated by 
the congruency of the trial (e.g., Chambon & Haggard, 
2012; Desender, Van Opstal, Hughes, & Van den Bussche, 
2016). Processing fluency is a very general term used 
to refer to a subjective ease or difficulty with which 
information is processed or a cognitive task is performed 
(Oppenheimer, 2008). When reporting subjective 
experiences of processing fluency or task difficulty, 
participants are making metacognitive judgements 
(Chambon & Haggard, 2012). Metacognition is a broad 
term introduced by Flavell (1979) and is often defined as 
“cognition about cognition”. In the current context, when 
we speak about metacognition, we narrow the definition 
to our ability to explicitly or subjectively monitor and 
52Questienne et al. Psychologica Belgica DOI: 10.5334/pb.508
evaluate an ongoing cognitive process. We do not have 
direct objective measures of the subjective experience of 
another person. The most direct access we can have, is 
simply to ask a participant to take an introspective look 
at his or her own subjective experiences and to provide 
us with an introspective report (for a related discussion, 
Timmermans & Cleeremans, 2015). 
Metacognitive judgements in the context of conflict 
tasks are an emerging topic in the literature. Researchers 
recently started investigating how and when such 
metacognitive judgements are created and whether they 
are used to install cognitive adaptation. A longer research 
tradition exists on metacognitive judgements in the field 
of memory and decision-making (for an overview, see 
Fleming & Dolan, 2012). Possibly, these findings can help 
us to better understand the relation between cognitive 
control and metacognition. 
METACOGNITIVE JUDGEMENTS IN 
DECISION-MAKING AND MEMORY 
RESEARCH
In the domain of decision-making, people are often 
asked to make confidence judgements on their own 
decisions (e.g., Fleming, Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012). For 
instance, participants categorise an ambiguous stimulus 
as belonging to one or the other category and then 
judge their confidence in this categorisation. It was first 
suggested that the confidence judgement was based 
on the same information as the one that leads to the 
categorisation of the stimulus (Galvin, Podd, Drga, 
& Whitmore, 2003; Vickers, 1979). Several theories 
on performance in perceptual decision tasks were 
developed based on the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff 
& Mckoon, 2008). This model suggests that, to create 
a binary categorisation of an ambiguous stimulus, 
evidence coming from visual processing accumulates 
with time. When this evidence accumulation crosses a 
threshold, a decision is taken. The confidence judgement 
would then depend on the same evidence accumulation 
as the one used to reach the decision (e.g., Galvin et al., 
2003; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009). However, dissociations 
have been observed between the performance in the 
categorisation task and the subsequent metacognitive 
judgement (e.g., Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & 
Slachevsky, 2009; Fleming et al., 2015; Rahnev et al., 
2011; Spence, Dux, & Arnold, 2016; Wilimzig et al., 2008). 
A very intuitive example of such a dissociation is the 
observation that after a decision, you end up changing 
your mind (e.g., Resulaj, Kiani, Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2009). 
To explain changes of mind, it was suggested that the 
accumulation of evidence could continue after the first-
order decision has been taken (e.g., Pleskac & Busemeyer, 
2010; Van den Berg et al., 2016). Another possibility is 
that the confidence judgement is based on information 
other than that used to make the decision (e.g., Fleming 
& Daw, 2017; Pasquali, Timmermans, & Cleeremans, 
2010; Wokke, Cleeremans, & Ridderinkhof, 2017). 
Recently, it was observed that confidence judgements 
are more accurate when the judgement takes place 
after the response to the first-order task rather than 
before (Siedlecka, Paulewicz, & Wierzchoń , 2016). 
Additionally, Kiani, Corthell, and Shadlen (2014) reported 
that confidence judgements are also influenced by the 
reaction time needed to make the decision. Together, 
these results suggest that confidence judgements are 
based, not only on perceptual information coming from 
the stimulus, but also on information contained within 
the response itself (see also Fleming & Daw, 2017; 
Murphy, Robertson, Harty, & O’Connell, 2015).
In the domain of memory, it has been observed that 
people can judge, when learning an item, the explicit belief 
about how successful the recall will be on subsequent 
testing (i.e., judgement of learning) (e.g., Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991; Vesonder & Voss, 1985). They can also 
judge, during the recall, how confident they are in the 
accuracy of this recall (e.g., Juslin, 1994; Kelley & Lindsay, 
1993) or whether they know the answer to a response, 
even if they are not able to recall it at the present moment 
(i.e., feeling of knowing and tip-of-tongue) (e.g., Brown 
& McNeill, 1966; Hart, 1965; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992). 
A first ‘direct account’ suggested that metacognitive 
judgements rely on a direct access to the memory 
traces (Hart, 1965). When asked to make a judgement of 
learning, learners would directly read out the strength of 
the memory trace that is currently formed (Cohen, Sandler, 
& Keglevich, 1991). This theory looks very much like the 
one in decision-making that suggests that confidence 
judgements are directly based on the same information 
as the first- order task. A direct account predicts a 
strong relation between the metacognitive judgements 
and the performance in the memory task itself. As 
with confidence judgements, dissociations between 
metacognitive judgements and memory performances 
were observed. Think for instance of the memory illusions 
where participants are convinced that they remember 
having memorized an item but never learned it (e.g., 
Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). Accordingly, an alternative 
hypothesis, the ‘inferential’ account, was proposed. 
The inferential account suggests that metacognitive 
judgements on memory result from inferences based 
on different internal and external sources of information 
(Kelley & Jacoby, 1990; Koriat, 1997; Schwartz, 1994). The 
hypothesis that several sources of information are used 
to create metacognitive judgements on memory, is very 
similar to the theories on decision-making (e.g., Siedlecka 
et al., 2016; Wessel et al., 2011).
The similarity in the observations made for confidence 
judgements in decision making and for metacognitive 
judgements on memory performance can bring interesting 
elements to the understanding of metacognitive 
53Questienne et al. Psychologica Belgica DOI: 10.5334/pb.508
judgements in general and to the processing of fluency 
in conflict tasks more specifically. First, metacognitive 
judgements would rely, at least partly, on post-response 
processes (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012, 2014). Consider 
for instance the case of error detection in the context 
of conflict tasks. Error detection refers to the ability to 
recognise our own errors in the absence of external 
feedback (Rabbitt, 1967). While confidence judgements 
call for the reporting of the likelihood of a correct response, 
error detection asks participants to report the likelihood 
of an error (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012, 2014). Several 
theories explain our ability to detect errors (for an overview, 
see Ullsperger et al., 2014). It has been suggested that 
after an error, post-response cognitive mechanisms would 
detect response conflict between the current incorrect 
response and the correct response subsequently activated 
(Yeung et al., 2004), a mismatch between an intended 
action and the actual action (Bernstein, Scheffers, & 
Coles, 1995; Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 
1991), or a reward prediction error (Alexander & Brown, 
2011; Brown & Braver, 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Holroyd, Yeung, Coles, & Cohen, 2005; Silvetti et al., 2011). 
Regardless of the exact interpretation, as with confidence 
judgements (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012, 2014; see also 
Boldt & Yeung, 2015), error detection seems to rely on 
post-response processes that provide information on the 
quality of the current response. Furthermore, additional 
information from sensory input and proprioception could 
also contribute to error detection (Wessel, 2012; Wessel, 
Danielmeier, & Ullsperger, 2011). 
The notion that metacognitive judgements would rely, 
at least partly, on post-response processes could also 
be an important element to explain, for instance, how 
participants are able to judge the congruency of a stimulus 
while the congruency itself is presented subliminally 
(Desender et al., 2014). Participants would have no 
conscious access to the congruency of the stimulus itself 
but instead would have conscious access to the evaluation 
of their motor response. Another interesting element is that 
regardless of the exact type, metacognitive judgements 
seem to be created on the basis of different sources of 
information (e.g., Siedlecka et al., 2016; Wessel et al., 
2011). Metacognitive judgements related to processing 
fluency in conflict tasks could then also rely on several 
sources of information at the same time.
METACOGNITIVE JUDGEMENTS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF CONFLICT TASKS
As mentioned above, processing fluency is a general term 
that refers to feelings of ease or difficulty associated with 
mental processes. Processing fluency can be related to 
any cognitive process (for an overview, see Oppenheimer, 
2008). Subjective experiences of processing fluency have 
been associated with perceptual processes (e.g., Reber, 
Wurtz, & Zimmermann, 2004), with linguistic processes 
(e.g., Alter & Oppenheimer, 2006) and/or with encoding 
and retrieval processes (Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005). In the 
case of conflict tasks, it has been suggested that the 
subjective experience of processing fluency is related to 
the process of action-selection (Chambon & Haggard, 
2012; Wenke et al., 2010). On incongruent trials, 
action-selection would be more difficult because of the 
activation of the incorrect response that triggers response 
competition. Participants would subjectively feel the 
difficulty related to this response competition. This can 
explain why, in a priming conflict task, participants are 
able to judge the congruency of a trial even if they are 
unaware of the prime (Desender et al., 2014), or why 
a congruency effect is observed on the metacognitive 
judgements of urge-to-err (Morsella et al., 2009), difficulty 
(Desender et al., 2016) or control (Chambon & Haggard, 
2012; Wenke et al., 2010). In a nutshell, congruency 
induces response competition that would modulate the 
subjective experience of processing fluency, thereby 
determining metacognitive judgements (see Figure 4).
While the idea that participants are subjectively sensitive 
to response competition seems a reasonable assumption, 
it remained a hypothesis based on indirect reasoning. 
It is known that incongruent trials lead to increased 
response competition (e.g., Hasbroucq, Possamaï, Bonnet, 
& Vidal, 1999). A congruency effect is also observed in 
several metacognitive judgements, as, for instance, in the 
judgement of difficulty (Desender et al., 2016). Participants 
associate incongruent trials with a stronger experience of 
difficulty compared to congruent trials. Taken together, 
it is inferred that the increased response competition 
determines the metacognitive judgements (e.g., Chambon 
& Haggard, 2012; Morsella et al., 2009). However, also 
on congruent trials, participants sometimes report an 
experience of difficulty (e.g., Desender et al., 2016). 
To preserve the idea that response competition is the 
source of the metacognitive judgement of difficulty, 
one then needs to assume that response competition 
can also be induced by other “undetermined” factors 
(like expectations) instead of an irrelevant competing 
stimulus dimension (Abrahamse & Braem, 2015). There 
are indeed reasons to consider that response competition 
can also sometimes occur on congruent trials (e.g., 
Yeung et al., 2004; Yeung, Cohen, & Botvinick, 2011). 
However, response competition on congruent trials does 
introduce some circularity in the reasoning: “A strong 
experience of difficulty was reported on a congruent trial. 
Hence, response competition must have been present 
and occurred for undetermined reasons. Consequently, 
response competition is the source of the subjective 
experience and the metacognitive judgement”. While 
circularity does not prove the argument to be wrong, it 
does make it more difficulty to falsify.
Additionally, as highlighted in studies on both 
decision-making and memory (see above), several other 
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factors, more or less directly related to congruency, could 
also influence the metacognitive judgements in conflict 
tasks (see Figure 4). These other factors could influence 
the metacognitive judgements directly or because 
they would contribute to the subjective experience of 
processing fluency (Koriat, 2000; Norman et al., 2010). 
We already mentioned the possibility that post-response 
evaluations contribute to metacognitive judgements, 
but this possibility was not directly investigated in this 
context. Additionally, a difficult process is usually a 
slow process (for an overview, see Oppenheimer, 2008; 
see also Reber et al., 2004). Slower reaction times are 
also closely related to response competition (MacLeod, 
1991). Consequently, in conflict tasks, reaction times 
could contribute to the subjective experience that a trial 
was difficult. Previous results show that reaction times 
do contribute but not entirely determine metacognitive 
judgements related to processing fluency (e.g., Chambon 
& Haggard, 2012; Desender et al., 2016). For instance, 
even when responses to congruent and incongruent 
trials in the same reaction time window are considered, 
still more difficulty is reported on incongruent compared 
to congruent trials (Desender et al., 2016). 
Questienne, Attas, Burle and Gevers (2018) directly 
investigated if and how different factors (visual 
congruency, reaction time, response competition) 
contribute to metacognitve judgments. Participants were 
asked to perform an arrow priming task. After each trial, 
participants were asked to provide a subjective report of 
their urge-to-err (e.g. how close were you to make an error 
on this trial?). Electromyographic (EMG) recordings of the 
response hands detected the presence of partial errors. 
Partial errors are sub-threshold EMG activations occurring 
on the incorrect hand before the correct response hand 
is activated. Such partial errors occur on 15–20% of the 
trials, are more frequent on incongruent events and 
are regarded as a good objective measure of response 
competition (Burle, Roger, Allain, Vidal, & Hasbroucq, 
2008). In the study of Questienne et al. (2018), both 
reaction time and partial errors were good predictors of 
urge-to-err reports, while this was not the case for the 
subjective reports on the visual congruency of the stimuli. 
This study nicely illustrates that different factors 
(e.g. RT, response competition, visual congruency) 
contribute to metacognitive judgements. A remaining 
question is whether participants weight these factors 
differently depending on the metacognitive question. 
In other words, can people introspect different aspect 
of conflict depending on the specific question asked? 
In the literature, several studies are described where 
participants made different kinds of metacognitive 
judgements. For instance, in some studies, participants 
were asked to report their subjective experience of 
difficulty (Desender et al., 2016), their subjective 
experience of conflict (Desender et al., 2014), their 
subjective experience of urge-to-err (Morsella et al., 
2009) or their subjective feeling of control (Chambon & 
Haggard, 2012; Wenke et al., 2010). In all these studies, 
a congruency effect was observed in the metacognitive 
judgements. Remarkably, regardless of the specific 
metacognitive judgement, these researchers interpreted 
this congruency effect as revealing a subjective sensitivity 
to response competition. This does however not need to 
be the case. In theory it is possible that the congruency 
effects in the metacognitive reports have their origin in 
different stages of stimulus and response processing, 
depending on the question. This issue was investigated 
by Questienne, van Dijck and Gevers (2018) who asked 
participants either to report their feeling of urge-to-err 
or their feelings of visual conflict. Demonstrating that 
subjective reports are valid and sensitive, they found 
that the subjective reports specifically followed either 
the response or the visual conflict. While the different 
factors were not measured independently in this study 
((in)congruent trials always contained both visual ans 
reponse conflict), it is a plausible assumption that the 
Figure 4 Potential sources of metacognitive judgements in conflict tasks.
The metacognitive judgement would mainly rely on processing fluency (i.e., a metacognitive experience of difficulty) determined by 
response competition. Other factors, directly or indirectly related to the stimulus congruency, could also influence the metacognitive 
experience of difficulty or the metacognitive judgement of conflict.
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underlying types of conflict contributed differently to the 
metacognitive questions asked.
In summary, it is established that participants judge 
incongruent trials differently than congruent trials, and 
while some initial steps have been taken, the origin of 
this/these metacognitive judgement(s) remains poorly 
understood. EMG recordings can serve to objectify the 
presence of response competition (Questienne et al., 
2018). Second, several other sources could contribute 
to different metacognitive judgements in an implicit or 
explicit way, but they have not yet been identified. To 
give an example, research on this topic could focus on 
the influence of emotional valence on metacognitive 
reports. Finally, it is possible that different subjective 
judgements reported in conflict tasks reflect different 
experiences (Questienne, Van dijck, & Gevers, 2018) but 
again more work on this topic is clearly needed.
DO CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCES OF 
PROCESSING FLUENCY TRIGGER 
COGNITIVE CONTROL?
Even though the origins and the relation between 
the different factors contributing to metacognitive 
judgements deserve more attention, it is established 
that participants judge incongruent trials differently 
from congruent trials. The question now is whether these 
metacognitive judgements influence the Gratton effect 
itself.
Consider again the study by Desender et al. (2014) 
where participants had to subjectively judge whether 
trials were incongruent or not in a subliminal priming 
conflict task. In this experiment, sometimes, participants 
judged congruent trials as incongruent and vice versa. 
After such trials, the Gratton effect depended on this 
subjective evaluation of congruency, not on the objective 
stimulus congruency. Using a different approach, 
Questienne, Van Opstal, van Dijck and Gevers (2018) 
reached a similar conclusion. Participants were explained 
that they were participating in a subliminal priming task, 
making it very difficult and sometimes even impossible to 
observe the prime. After the trial, participants were asked 
to indicate whether they believed the trial was a conflict 
trial or not. Unknownst to the particpants however, the 
prime was not presented on a large proportion of the 
trials. Regardless of the absence of the prime (and thus 
the absence of an objective visual conflict), a Gratton 
effect was observed in those trials were the participants 
indicated to have experienced a conflict. Together with 
the results of Desender et al (2014), these results suggest 
that there is a relation between the metacognitive 
judgement related to processing fluency and the Gratton 
effect. These findings were partly replicated by Jiang and 
colleagues (Jiang, Correa, Geerts & van Gaal, 2018, see 
also Foerster, Pfister, Reuss, & Kunde, 2017). Crucially 
however, they also showed that behavioral adaptation 
could be observed when conflict was present but not 
subjectively experienced. Clearly, more work on these 
important yet different observations is needed. 
Such findings reopen the debate about the role of 
consciousness in the Gratton effect. Does the conscious 
subjective evaluation (i.e., the metacognitive judgement) 
play a role in conflict adaptation? As observed by 
Questienne, Van Opstal, Van Dijck and Gevers (2018), the 
mere subjective experience of processing fluency, could 
be important to trigger the Gratton effect (see Figure 5a). 
An interesting case report in this respect was reported 
by Naccache et al. (2005). They reported the case of a 
patient who did not report any subjective experience of 
difficulty when responding to Stroop incongruent trials. 
Remarkably, the patient still presented a Gratton effect. 
While this remains a single case report, this result seems 
to argue against a causal role of the metacognitive 
judgement and/or experience in the Gratton effect. 
However, caution is needed for at least two reasons. 
First, the task used in this study was a two-choice Stroop 
task. As outlined before, the Gratton effect can be 
generated by bottom-up influence of stimulus repetition/
alternation in this kind of task (for review see Duthoo et 
al., 2014). The observed Gratton effect could then be the 
effect triggered by this low-level influence, while the part 
of the effect triggered by top-down influence could still 
be impaired. Second, while this patient did not report a 
subjective experience of difficulty on incongruent trials, 
she was still able to indicate that she was responding 
slower on these trials. This means that she was still able 
to make some metacognitive judgements related to the 
congruency of the trials. This case report does seem to 
indicate that different metacognitive judgements can be 
dissociated. The metacognitive judgement of difficulty 
can be dissociated from the metacognitive judgement 
related to performance (i.e., reaction time). Nevertheless, 
it remains possible that the metacognitive judgement 
related to performance still plays a role in the Gratton 
effect.
However, the co-occurrence of metacognitive 
judgements and the Gratton effect on itself does not 
necessarily imply a causal relationship between the two 
(Abrahamse & Braem, 2015). It remains possible that 
metacognitive judgements and the Gratton effect are 
both triggered by a common factor without a direct link 
between both (see Figure 5b). In this case, the relationship 
between subjective evaluations and the Gratton effect 
would only be correlational (see also Hommel, 2013).
Following this reasoning, Abrahamse and Braem 
(2015) argued that if the metacognitive judgement 
is related to the occurrence of response competition, 
the results obtained by Desender et al. (2014) can be 
explained by the conflict monitoring theory without 
giving any causal role to the metacognitive judgement. 
As illustrated in Figure 5b, when a trial occurs, the trial 
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is judged as congruent or incongruent based on the 
occurrence of response competition. In parallel, as 
suggested by the conflict monitoring theory, the level of 
response competition is monitored by the ACC, triggering 
cognitive control if response competition is detected. 
In most of the cases, incongruent trials are associated 
with response competition, while congruent ones are 
not. Overall then, trials would be judged correctly and a 
typical Gratton effect would be triggered (Botvinick et al., 
2001). However, because response competition can also 
occur on some congruent trials because of factors other 
than stimulus congruency (Yeung et al., 2004, 2011), 
some congruent trials will be wrongly interpreted as 
“incongruent”. At the same time, response competition 
will trigger cognitive control. Superficially, the Gratton 
effect will look as if it follows the metacognitive 
judgement. But, the Gratton effect would not be caused 
by the metacognitive judgement. The relation is only 
correlational.
To understand the relation between metacognitive 
judgements related to congruency and cognitive control 
mechanisms in conflict tasks, it is essential to have a 
better understanding of what is really ‘felt’ during a 
conflict task and how this subjective experience is used 
to make a metacognitive judgement. More specifically, 
it asks us to clarify the relationship between response 
competition and metacognitive judgement in the context 
of sconflict tasks. We outlined above that participants 
judge incongruent trials differently from congruent 
trials, but that the origin of this/these metacognitive 
judgement(s) is poorly understood. Further research 
should aim to clarify the origin(s) of these metacognitive 
judgements related to processing fluency in conflict 
tasks and their relationship to cognitive control. 
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